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Abstract
We consider a recently described attack on a key establishment protocol contained in a
draft international standard. Based on an observation as to why the attack is possible, we
propose a simple modication to the protocol which avoids the attack.
1 Introduction
Horng and Hsu, [2], have shown how a attack can be launched on a key establishment protocol
they call the Helsinki Protocol. This protocol is designed to establish a shared secret key between
two entities A and B, and is specied as Key Transport Mechanism 6 in Clause 7.6 of ISO/IEC
DIS 11770{3, [3]. It is claimed in [3] that this protocol provides mutual entity authentication
and mutual key conrmation, i.e. both A and B have conrmation that the other party has a
copy of the shared key.
However, if the attack is successfully carried out by a malicious third party C, then B believes
it has authenticated and established a shared secret key with A, whereas A believes it has
authenticated and established a (dierent) shared secret key with C. This means that the claim
of mutual key conrmation is incorrect, and the claim of mutual authentication is at best highly
suspect.
Before proceeding observe that the Helsinki protocol is actually a derivative of a protocol orig-
inally described by Needham and Schroeder in 1978, [7]. It also embodies features from the
COMSET protocol, which was devised as part of the RIPE project, [1]. For further information
see Sections 12.5.1 and 12.10 of [6].
Also note that the Horng-Hsu attack is closely related to the Lowe attack on the Needham-
Schroeder protocol, [4, 5]. Moreover, the modication we propose below to the Helsinki protocol
corresponds directly to the modications Lowe proposes to the Needham-Schroeder protocol.
In [5] Lowe proves that his modied Needham-Schroeder protocol is secure (within a specied
formal model), giving added condence that the modied version of the Helsinki protocol is
sound.
1
2 The Protocol
The protocol in question involves the exchange of three messages between A and B. The
protocol requires A and B to have an agreed public key encryption scheme, and to have their
own encryption/decryption key pairs for this scheme. We also assume that A and B have
(reliably) exchanged their public keys. The protocol messages are as follows.
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where E
X
(Y ) denotes the public key encryption of data Y using the private encryption key ofX ,
X jjY denotes the concatenation of data items X and Y , I
X
is an identier for entity X , r
A
and
r
B
are random `nonces' (i.e. one-time random challenges), and K
A
and K
B
are key components,
generated by A and B respectively.
At the end of the protocol K
A
and K
B
are combined using a one-way function to establish a
shared secret key. Of course, to give a complete specication of the protocol we need to indicate
what checks are performed by A and B during execution of the protocol, but for the sake of
brevity we omit them here.
3 The Horng-Hsu attack and an observation
The attack in [2] operates as follows. C commences the attack by causing A to inaugurate a run
of the protocol with C. A then sends the following message:
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C decrypts the message to obtain r
A
, and uses it to create a forged message M
0
1
, containing a
new key component K
0
A
, which C sends to B. When sending this message, C pretends that it
is from A.
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B responds to C (thinking it is responding to A) with the following message:
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C intercepts this message and forwards it (unchanged) to A. A responds to C with the following
message:
M
3
: A! C: r
B
C then forwards this message to B.
After these exchanges:
 A believes it has established a shared secret key with C, based on the key components K
A
and K
B
(although C does not know K
B
), and
 B believes it has established a shared secret key with A, based on the key components K
0
A
and K
B
(although A does not know K
0
A
).
Note that this is an example of an `Insider attack'. This holds since, in order to launch the
attack, C must persuade A to inaugurate a run of the protocol, and hence C must be an entity
with whom A is prepared to establish a shared secret key.
Note also that this attack is possible since, whereas B actually generates M
2
, A will believe it
comes from C. This is possible because message M
2
contains no indication of its source (unlike
message M
1
). Hence, although C cannot discover the precise contents of message M
2
, C can
forward it to A and have it accepted as originating from C, although it was actually generated
by B.
4 A revised version of the protocol
Based on the observation we have just made about why the attack is possible, we propose that
the protocol should be modied in the following minimal way. The second message M
2
should
be replaced by a modied message, which we call N
2
:
N
2
: B ! A: E
A
(I
B
jjK
B
jjr
A
jjr
B
)
That is, the only change is to insert an identier for B in the second protocol message. The
other two protocol messages remain unchanged.
5 Conclusions
We have describes a simple modication to the Helsinki protocol which prevents the Horng-
Hsu attack, but yet which does not add signicantly to the communications or computational
overhead for the protocol. Note that both the original and amended protocols depend very much
on an implicit property of the public key encryption scheme. Specically, the protocols require
the encryption scheme to provide a measure of integrity protection for encrypted strings.
Added note
After completion of this paper and circulation of a preprint at the April 1998 meeting, ISO/IEC
JTC1/SC27/WG2 agreed that, when it is published, ISO/IEC 11770-3 will contain the modied
version of the Key Transport Mechanism 6 described in this paper.
References
[1] A. Bosselaers and B. Preneel, editors. Integrity Primitives for Secure Information Systems:
Final Report of RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation RIPE-RACE 1040. Number 1007 in
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1995.
[2] G. Horng and C.-K. Hsu. Weakness in the Helsinki protocol. Electronics Letters, 34:354{355,
1998.
[3] International Organization for Standardization, Geneve, Switzerland. ISO/IEC 2nd DIS
11770{3, Information technology|Security techniques|Key management; Part 3: Mecha-
nisms using asymmetric techniques, July 1997.
[4] G. Lowe. An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. Infor-
mation Processing Letters, 56:131{133, 1995.
[5] G. Lowe. Breaking and xing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In
Margaria and Steen, editors, Tools and algorithms for the construction and analysis of
systems, number 1055 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 147{166. Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 1996.
[6] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, and S.A. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied Cryptography.
CRC Press, Boca Raton, 1997.
[7] R.M. Needham and M.D. Schroeder. Using encryption for authentication in large networks
of computers. Communications of the ACM, 21:993{999, 1978.
